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Abstract
Background: In the nearly half century since it began lending for population projects, the World Bank has become
one of the largest financiers of global health projects and programs, a powerful voice in shaping health agendas in
global governance spaces, and a mass producer of evidentiary knowledge for its preferred global health
interventions. How can social scientists interrogate the role of the World Bank in shaping ‘global health’ in the
current era?
Main body: As a group of historians, social scientists, and public health officials with experience studying the
effects of the institution’s investment in health, we identify three challenges to this research. First, a future research
agenda requires recognizing that the Bank is not a monolith, but rather has distinct inter-organizational groups that
have shaped investment and discourse in complicated, and sometimes contradictory, ways. Second, we must
consider how its influence on health policy and investment has changed significantly over time. Third, we must
analyze its modes of engagement with other institutions within the global health landscape, and with the private
sector. The unique relationships between Bank entities and countries that shape health policy, and the Bank’s
position as a center of research, permit it to have a formative influence on health economics as applied to
international development. Addressing these challenges, we propose a future research agenda for the Bank’s
influence on global health through three overlapping objects of and domains for study: knowledge-based (shaping
health policy knowledge), governance-based (shaping health governance), and finance-based (shaping health
financing). We provide a review of case studies in each of these categories to inform this research agenda.
Conclusions: As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to rage, and as state and non-state actors work to build more
inclusive and robust health systems around the world, it is more important than ever to consider how to best
document and analyze the impacts of Bank’s financial and technical investments in the Global South.
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Background
Within six years of establishing a division for direct
lending for health in 1979, the World Bank1 became the
largest financial investor in health to countries in the
Global South [42]. Since then, the Bank has been con-
sistently among the most influential actors in global
health [11, 56]. Alongside its direct lending, it has posi-
tioned itself as a self-described “Knowledge Bank” [43,
80], producing expertise on health policy and financing,
and has taken on new roles within global health partner-
ships and trust funds. Because of its considerable sway
in global health and vast financial resources and net-
works, the World Bank’s influence on health sector pri-
orities and resource mobilization has been and should
continue to be an object of scrutiny. As a development
bank whose main modalities are government loans and
grants, and whose twin mandate is to end extreme pov-
erty and support shared prosperity, the Bank has a
unique perspective in the global health landscape. Fur-
ther, the institution’s global health influence sits within
its considerable financial influence on international de-
velopment as a whole [22]. How, then, can social scien-
tists and historians interrogate the World Bank’s varied
influence on “global health” in the current era? How can
we improve the relevance of research findings, for hold-
ing the Bank to account, recognizing its successes and
the contexts in which they are actually reproducible, and
assuring that the Bank’s perspectives on health policy
are balanced by perspectives from the countries in which
it works? The COVID-19 pandemic has shown how cru-
cial strong, flexible, and inclusive health systems are for
guaranteeing the well-being of the world’s population,
and it has also made it clear how the conditions by
which health systems are constructed are fundamental
to how they perform under such pressure. It has become
all the more important to consider how social science
research can better document the World Bank’s influ-
ence on health systems in the Global South, and the
ways it exerts this influence.
How to best study the World Bank’s influence and
power in global health was the topic of a symposium that
brought together experts on the topic at the Brocher
Foundation in January 2019, under the auspices of Devi
Sridhar’s Wellcome Trust-funded project, The Economic
Gaze: The World Bank’s Influence in Global Public Health.
The project’s research (conducted by Fernandes, Sridhar,
Stein, Tichenor, and Winters) focused on the influence of
the Bank’s “traditional” arms of development aid: the
International Development Association (IDA) and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD). From 2016 through 2019, among other research
activities, the project team performed extensive literature
reviews of the Bank’s past work in global health, which
grappled with its widespread “influence” in global health
governance. These included the Bank’s own narratives,
which largely described its influence in terms of financial
allocations to various health sector themes and dissemin-
ation of key health sector policy papers (e.g., [14]). They
also included narratives produced by the Independent
Evaluation Group (IEG), which are unique because they
are both internal and external: the group is constituted of
independent evaluators of the Bank’s work but it reports
to the Executive Board and is shaped by the World Bank
Group Strategy. From this internal perspective, the Bank
emphasized poverty alleviation and population control in
the 1970s, increasing focus on primary health care and
“health reform” from around 1987–1996, and the sector-
wide approach for health system strengthening from 1997
to the mid-2000s. These internal narratives also include
flagship reports the Bank has disseminated about its own
vision of health knowledge, governance, and financing.
This includes its seminal 1993 World Development Re-
port, “Investing in Health,” which Dean Jamison – one of
its architects – described as a “centre left report from a
centre right institution” ([36]:1871; [81]). As such, the re-
port has been criticized from various technical and polit-
ical perspectives [50], including that it had the potential to
infuse all corners of health policy and governance with the
logics of economics (e.g. [38, 71]) and that public invest-
ment in education would be better than health for stimu-
lating economic growth [77].
Political science, health policy, anthropology, and his-
tory studies add nuance to this health sector theme-
based narrative of the Bank’s influence, particularly by
relating it to other players in the global health govern-
ance landscape. These studies often challenge the posi-
tivism of internal Bank narratives, such as by
theoretically grounding the concept of “health reform”
in neoliberalism (e.g., [37, 47]). In the first external,
comprehensive study of the Bank’s work in the health
sector since the 1960s, for instance, Kamran Abbasi ex-
plained that the Bank eclipsed the World Health
Organization (WHO) in influence in the 1980s due to its
financial prowess, and he pointed to controversial
themes raised by its “critics,” including the Bank’s struc-
tural adjustment and user fee policies in the late 1980s,
and its embrace of private health care provision and dis-
ability adjusted life years (DALYs) during the 1990s [1,
2]. Sophie Harman has further argued that the Bank’s
market-driven health ideologies have become so
1In this review, we specifically use the term ‘World Bank’ (or ‘Bank’) to
refer to the International Development Association (IDA) and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), or
the traditional Health, Nutrition, and Population (HNP) sector. ‘World
Bank Group’ (or ‘WBG’) is used when considering the Bank’s wider
interaction with the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and private
markets.
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strategically ingrained in global health governance that
the Bank “no longer needs to use large loans with strin-
gent conditionalities to influence global health” ([25]:
242), and Devi Sridhar has described how human capital
theories contributed to extending the reach of the Bank’s
influential “economic gaze” on global health [62, 63].
The Bank’s influence on health policy knowledge pro-
duction, governance, and financing has been tackled dir-
ectly or indirectly by a growing number of case studies,
most of which have never been compiled or collectively
analyzed. These studies variously describe the Bank’s in-
fluence in terms of its power to guide priority-setting
through its creation and dissemination of efficiency-
grounded metrics; its power to leverage financial assets
and a financial management approach to promote spe-
cific types of health investments; and its power to guide
decision-making, relative to other global health institu-
tions and nations. Based on research conducted by the
Economic Gaze project team and consensus-making dis-
cussions during and after the symposium, we propose
three research ‘domains’ that may help to better capture
the World Bank Group’s (WBG’s) nuanced influence in
the global health realm: (1) knowledge-based (how it is
produced, who produces it, and what impact it has), (2)
governance-based (who is involved in producing health
policy and promoting it in spaces of governance), and
(3) finance-based (how financing mechanisms are devel-
oped and implemented).
Our proposed domains are best viewed heuristically as
‘lenses’ for analysis. Rather than provide a systematic re-
view of all case studies of the WBG’s work in health, this
review article focuses on these three domains and how
they may inform a future research agenda on the WBG’s
entangled forms of power that have contributed to its
ability to wield unique influence in global health. As ex-
panded upon in Additional file 1: Table 1, each domain
can be conceptualized from two vantage points: the ob-
ject of study (knowledge, governance, and financing) and
the types of power that it best unpacks (discursive, ex-
pert, network, institutional, and economic). Our
conceptualization of the institution’s influence and
power in the global health sphere is informed by Suerie
Moon’s [44] expanded typology of power in the global
governance space: physical, economic, structural, institu-
tional, moral, discursive, expert, and network. The do-
mains are best viewed not as three discrete typologies of
influence, but instead as three overlapping ways to more
comprehensively approach the Bank’s influence and ex-
plore the role of power in the Bank’s work in global
health, including its power to shape the language in
which research on itself is conducted.
In the main text of this review, we first outline the
three intrinsic challenges of studying the World Bank,
and then put forward these three major research
domains that would promote a more equitable and
locally-relevant research agenda on the World Bank
Group’s influence in global health. It is important to
note that our research agenda was elaborated largely be-
fore the COVID-19 pandemic, and particular attention
to the ways that the pandemic has reconfigured and will
continue to refigure global health governance has not
been incorporated into our review. However, considering
the sheer amount of funding and technical support that
the WBG provides for supporting health, it remains im-
perative that social scientists and historians strengthen
existing research on the organization by building a ro-
bust and heterogeneous body of case studies of the
WBG’s investments in global health, particularly from
those most impacted by these investments.
Methods
This review of case studies is based on two methods of
interrogating the World Bank Group’s influence on glo-
bal health: document analysis conducted throughout the
course of the Economic Gaze project and discussions at
and after a symposium in January 2019. As described
above, document analysis was conducted by the project
members (Fernandes, Sridhar, Stein, Tichenor, and Win-
ters) between 2016 and 2019 to identify key case studies
and important themes. The symposium was hosted by
the Brocher Foundation near Geneva, Switzerland and
brought together an international network of historians,
anthropologists, economists, political scientists, public
health scholars, and representatives of health ministries,
all with experience studying or working with the Bank.
Scholars and practitioners were selected for participation
based on geographic representation and thematic contri-
bution to World Bank and international finance institu-
tion analyses, in order to provide a breadth of
disciplinary lenses and of institutional perspectives on
the many points of entry the WBG uses to shape health
knowledge, governance, and financing. This selection
process was conducted in two ways. First, the article’s
first two authors created a list of potential participants
through the review of literature on the World Bank,
intentionally seeking out geographic and disciplinary
breadth in approaches to analyzing the Bank. Second,
they left five of the twenty planned invitations open to
early career researchers, whose participation would be
fully funded, and widely advertised the application in
order to include researchers who were harder to find
through the review of literature, particularly those from
the Global South. The initial intention of the sympo-
sium, titled “Disrupting Global Health Narratives: Alter-
native Perspectives on the World Bank’s Influence on
Global Health,” was to present examples of past case
studies from all symposium participants’ research, and
to weave them into a narrative of the Bank’s influence
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on global health. This “counter-narrative” would chal-
lenge what we perceived as a relatively “neat” Bank time-
line of its own role in the global health sphere, providing
a “history from below.”
Through our presentations and discussions at the sym-
posium, and our discussions in the months after, it be-
came clear that, not only is the WBG’s own narrative of
its role in global health anything but neat, but some of
the areas of anticipated contention (e.g., the generally
negative effects of user fees and structural adjustment,
which is described further below) had been explored
through strong case studies. Yet, others – particularly
those related to private sector investment and analysis of
power dynamics in the setting of the Bank’s country
plans and strategies – were starkly lacking. Furthermore,
many of the existing case studies seemed to be operating
in their own silos and with different sets of assumptions:
many did not cite relevant publications from outside of
their academic areas, and the boundaries of what was
considered health at the Bank (e.g., nutrition, the trad-
itional organizational arms of the IBRD and the IDA, or
the WBG) were often unclear. The review presented
here is the result of collective work of gathering case
studies, discussing relevant themes, and identifying cru-
cial gaps to be filled with future research. The frame-
work for structuring this review – based on Suerie
Moon’s [44] typology of power – was chosen based on
our months of discussion during and after the sympo-
sium, and with the very helpful guidance of our anonym-
ous reviewers.
Three challenges to studying the World Bank’s
role on Global Health
In order to understand our proposed three domains for
future research, we must first outline three central chal-
lenges to studying the WBG’s role in global health.
These challenges were first identified during discussions
at the symposium, and include: the WBG’s internal com-
plexity, its shifting approaches to health over the course
of more than 40 years of health investment, and its en-
tanglement with a growing number of actors in the glo-
bal health space.
The first challenge requires recognizing that the
World Bank is not a monolith, and its health portfolio
extends beyond its Health, Nutrition, and Population
(HNP) division, such that it is essential to carefully con-
sider how researchers are defining the World Bank and
whether their definition is appropriate. The so-called
World Bank Group (WBG) is made up of different en-
tities with distinct mandates that place health within a
constellation of other development objectives. For this
reason as well as the fact that, as a development bank
and mentioned above, its main mode of intervention is a
loan to a government, the WBG’s approach to health
development is distinct from that of the United Nation’s
specialized agency for health, the World Health
Organization (WHO). The WBG entities – especially the
IDA, the IBRD, the International Finance Corporation
(IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA) – each include substantial health pro-
grams and systems financing in their portfolios. Focusing
exclusively on the IBRD and the IDA risks misunder-
standing the WBG’s relationship with the private sector,
which it has promoted in various forms over the last
four decades (particularly through the IFC), as a means
for, in its own words, enhancing health equity. Further-
more, alongside the Bank’s (traditional) core HNP sector
lending and engagement with the private sector, it is also
important to consider its large and often fragmented
trust fund infrastructure, as well as the WBG’s projects
with health objectives or impacts in allied sectors, such
as food security and post-conflict reconstruction.
Second, the WBG’s influence on health policy and in-
vestment has changed over time, and the impacts of
these policies and investments are often nuanced. In the
1980s and early 1990s, the WBG helped shape the health
landscapes in many countries that received funding from
the financial institution, as it advocated for private sector
funding, the introduction of user fees [6], and other
forms of health system self-financing (Akin et al. 1987).
Many scholars have argued that the public expenditure
reduction requirements in the WBG’s and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Pro-
grams were factors that led to many beneficiary
countries’ smaller national health budgets [45, 52].
While this has been widely depicted as an embrace of
neoliberalism and a driver of reduced national health in-
vestments [67], there is also evidence that per capita
public health spending in some countries under adjust-
ment either decreased only marginally or actually in-
creased since 2000 [49]. Further complicating the
historiography of the Bank’s reform policies, former
Bank President Jim Yong Kim signaled a reversal in the
Bank’s position on user fees in 2013, by highlighting the
importance of their elimination [33]. At the same time,
another of the WBG’s arms – the IFC – has ramped up
its health lending by investing in private health busi-
nesses as well as using capital markets since the 2000s,
especially for health infrastructure, through initiatives
like its – now defunct – controversial Health in Africa
program [41].
Third, understanding the WBG’s influence requires
careful consideration of its modes of engagement with
other institutions within the global health landscape, and
with the private sector, which give it a unique – and
powerful – position in this landscape. The Bank’s eco-
nomic power is further described in the section on the fi-
nancing domain below. The rise of voluntary funding to
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United Nations agencies in the 1970s and 1980s [24] led
to financing gaps for some core WHO and United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) health programming, particu-
larly for immunization, in the 1990s. Through its trust
fund (that is, extra-budgetary aid) health portfolio, the
Bank was increasingly able to capture private capital for
global health in the 1990s and 2000s. This enabled it to
act as financial trustee of (and sit on boards of) burgeon-
ing partnerships with the WHO and other multilateral
global public-private partnerships for health, like the Glo-
bal Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and
Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance [11, 79]. Such a wide-reaching
financial network makes the WBG an attractive lender to
countries from the Global South, and accessing Bank
funding has been regarded as a test of confidence, opening
the door to negotiations with other donors. However, it
also means that it can be hard to tease-out the Bank’s in-
fluence relative to that of other major global health insti-
tutions, such as its role in undermining United Nations
agencies’ ability to fulfil their mandates. Tracing the
WBG’s influential health policy knowledge is particularly
complex as it is often produced in partnership with other
global health institutions [23], like in the case of the intro-
duction of the disability adjusted life year (DALY) and the
healthy life expectancy (HALE) metrics, which resulted
from research partnerships with the WHO and Harvard
University [69]. Among other users of these metrics, the
WHO and the World Bank have used the DALY and the
HALE to create both their global health estimates and
baselines for monitoring progress towards universal health
coverage [82, 83]. Together, these forms of influence –
and the challenges to capturing this influence – indicate
that the Bank has the ability to develop internal health
agendas, pitch them to countries using its contacts within
ministries of health and ministries of finance, provide fi-
nancing, obtain legitimization through other global health
actors (like the private sector and civil society organiza-
tions), and ultimately influence the agendas of United Na-
tions agencies.
Three proposed domains for studying the World
Bank’s influence on Global Health
Drawing on this broad understanding of the World
Bank’s influence and challenges to capturing it, we
propose three domains for studying the Bank’s influence
and power in global health (Additional file 1: Table 1).
In doing so, we assert that any social scientific or histor-
ical investigation must be careful not to simply amplify
the organization’s own historiography and institutional
ethos, as the WBG has been prolific in creating repre-
sentations of its influence and work in the health sector.
We highlight some of the limitations of each of these
domains, and consider how a careful use of source ma-
terial may help address these limitations. As discussed
above, these domains are overlapping and the same
forms of power may be at play across many of them –
they are best seen as three categories for understanding
the Bank’s discourse and actions with three different ob-
jects of study as their lenses. They represent a matrix
through which researchers may study the WBG’s pos-
ition in the evolving global health landscape, the ways in
which the Bank’s position on different global health con-
cepts – like universal health coverage – have changed
over time, and how these changes have impacted health
priorities and provision in the Global South.
Knowledge-based: shaping health policy knowledge
The first important object of study is the knowledge that
the Bank produces about health policy and project im-
plementation. Two of Moon’s [44] forms of power are
central to understanding the WBG’s role here: expert, or
shaping “what others consider to be legitimate know-
ledge,” and discursive, or shaping “the language others
use to conceptualize, frame, and thereby define and
understand an issue.” The World Bank produces exten-
sive research to help shape country-level health policy
and global health initiatives through various means, in-
cluding through what is now known as the Development
Research Group (DRG). In its 1998 World Development
Report, “Knowledge for Development,” then-Bank Presi-
dent James Wolfensohn embraced the idea of the Bank
as a “Knowledge Bank,” in what Broad [9] has argued
was a push to reassert the Bank’s legitimacy as its finan-
cial influence waned in the mid-1990s. The institution’s
discursive and expert power can be seen in the ways that
concepts and theories are put forward in the “technical”
assistance the Bank provides. Such assistance takes the
form of training and policy guidance, and it goes hand
in hand with both direct lending or participation in glo-
bal health partnerships and debates in spaces of global
health governance, including working groups like the
Inter-agency and Expert Group for Sustainable Develop-
ment Goal Indicators (IAEG-SDGs) or events like the
United Nations High-Level Meeting (UN HLM) on Uni-
versal Health Coverage.
There has been both continuity and change in the
Bank’s concepts and theories that have gained purchase
or have been rejected in these global governance spaces.
For instance, the Bank has consistently applied theories
of human capital to the health sector since the 1970s; it
linked the economic “stock” of healthy individuals to dis-
ease control and nutrition during Robert McNamara’s
tenure as Bank President in the 1970s [61, 78], doubled-
down on human resources as a critical contributor to
economic growth in the 1980s [5], and recently put for-
ward the human capital index metric [35, 66]. Yet, its
embrace of privatization has been much more punctu-
ated. While the Bank’s 1975 Health Policy Paper and
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1980 World Development Report warned against heavy
emphasis on cost-benefit analysis, user fees, and private
sector delivery, health economists such as David de Fer-
ranti advocated for a more pluralist mix of public, insur-
ance, and voluntary sector funding in the early 1980s,
including user fees for public institutions [4, 67]. Al-
though user fees have been critiqued by some within the
institution [13, 33], this pluralistic approach has contin-
ued with the Bank’s advocacy of universal health
coverage.
Social scientists have shown that, while the Bank has
made a deep impression on global health, health econo-
mists and other experts at the Bank often work in coord-
ination with other global health institutions or amplify
longstanding health research. Since the 1980s, scholars
have reflected upon the Bank’s success in infusing lan-
guages (and underlying ideologies) of economics into
international and global health [3, 11, 18, 32, 56]. Others
have effectively shown how many of these concepts pre-
dated World Bank involvement in global health, and that
the Bank’s influence must be understood in a longer tra-
jectory of health development [23, 73]. Some argue that
there has been a shift towards economic knowledge at the
expense of other forms of reasoning at the Bank, in ways
that have marginalized rights-based discourse [58, 59] and
particular country-specific contexts [43, 67] in its policies
and program implementation. Further, Walker (2019) has
highlighted that the Bank’s emphasis on economic man-
agement in health has not necessarily been matched by a
consistent application of economic tools to health project
planning – pointing again to the importance of studying
the Bank’s shifting and heterogeneous approaches, and
disconnects between discourse and practice.
This research domain sits within a larger scholarly
conversation about how international organizations’
knowledge production is a key mode of producing and
maintaining power in the global governance space. The
Bank’s discursive and expert power in shaping economic,
political, social, and environmental knowledge extends
far beyond its health work, and scholars have shown
how the Bank has leveraged these forms of power to set
itself apart in the international development landscape.
These include the Bank’s use of country-level policy and
institutional benchmarks as a “governing tool” for assert-
ing authority over both recipients and donors of Bank
funds [57], and how the Bank, as a “strategic knowledge
institution,” has promoted “smaller and better govern-
ment” in its influential knowledge about good govern-
ance ([16]:118). Nay [46] shows how, alongside the
OECD, the World Bank has played an institutional role
in the “consolidation and perpetuation of the aid donors’
policy doctrine,” here, by producing knowledge about
the concept of the “fragile state” and protecting the con-
cept from “dissent” in the process.
With these cases in mind, future social scientific re-
search into the World Bank’s role in shaping policy
knowledge and expertise about health should consider
two main questions. First, which actors are (and are not)
involved in producing knowledge at the Bank? In other
words, whose research agenda drives the Bank-initiated
production of knowledge? How involved are local
scholars in the production of knowledge relative to more
powerful Bank staff and “clients” (like major donors),
and whose interests does evidence serve? Second, how
are the data so produced used? Do they guide health
policy-making, or are they used post-hoc to justify deci-
sions already made? The latter questions focus on the
functional use of estimates like the global burden of dis-
ease (GBD), and may be most relevant in the case of
performance- or results-based financing, as discussed
further in the finance section below. This is particularly
important because recent research has indicated that the
metrics and tools put forward by the Bank are often not
used to assess loans, due to their irrelevance to complex
political negotiations [19].
We recommend that scholars undertake country or
programmatic case studies for this research domain. For
instance, how have in-country WBG officials leveraged
global estimates of disease, or advocated for local data
collection on maternal and child health? Or, how have
different entities within the WBG defined the concept of
“universal health coverage” [70], “right to health” [58], or
“gender equality” [60]? What factors influence discourse
around these concepts and what influence do they have
on in-country population health and/or programmatic
outcomes? Such case studies would further enable health
development leaders in countries that receive Bank
funding to contextualize health policy recommendations
and advocate for more country-owned means of know-
ledge production, and to highlight the ways that context-
ual knowledge can be used in health development
policy. These case studies may be best accomplished
through discourse analysis and qualitative thematic ana-
lysis of documents, particularly of archival data at the
WBG Archives, partner nation archives, and key inform-
ant interviews. In theory, the World Bank could be a
strong ally in this advocacy: a strength of the Bank’s
country-based model is that it is uniquely placed to pro-
mote local capacity for development, including cham-
pioning the in-country production of health data over
the use of estimated data [75].
Governance-based: shaping global health governance
Our second recommended research domain is the role
of the WBG since the 1980s in changing the nature of
health governance at the supranational, national, and
sub-national levels. Here, the two most important forms
of power are institutional, or the “use of rules and
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decision-making procedures to shape decision-making,”
and network, or the use of “personal relationships with
others to shape their thinking and/or action” ([44]:6–7).
The Bank is institutionally different from other global
health actors like UN agencies (including the WHO),
philanthropic organizations, and bilateral donors. It is an
organization with member states whose votes matter
more, at the end of the day, based on how much money
they provide to the institution. Unlike the WHO,
UNICEF, or other global health donors, its point of con-
tact on the country level are ministers of finance, linking
it more closely to those with the funds to back up its
policy recommendations. With the diminishing influence
of the WHO, due to the freezing of its budgets and the
rise of earmarked health funding [10, 11], the Bank be-
came one of the most important global health financiers
in the 1980s, although HNP financing has certainly fluc-
tuated in the decades since. However, like its insertion
into the health policy knowledge world, officials at the
WBG have introduced new ways of staking a financial
claim in the global health landscape. For instance, in the
push to increase investment from “billions to trillions,”
the WBG is positioning itself to de-risk private equity;
new financing mechanisms include trust funds to fi-
nance outbreak response by channeling funding from re-
insurance and bond markets [65], impact investments
for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and IFC
financing for health projects, which now include specific
budgetary allocations for blended finance [15].
Research is needed that situates the WBG’s influence
relative to other global health actors and borrowing
countries through two inter-related questions. First, to
what extent does the WBG’s financial power affect its
power to influence health policy at the country level?
This question considers the ways that the WBG has in-
fluenced countries’ health financing. It also highlights
the WBG’s relationship with ministries of finance, which
is a privileged position in comparison to the WHO’s
point of contact on the national level being ministries of
health (e.g. [64]). Second, it is important to investigate
the ways that the WBG has supported both vertical and
horizontal programming – through the IDA and the
IBRD’s main modalities (project financing and associated
policy advice), the IFC’s investments, and the MIGA’s
risk reduction for investment. That is, in what ways has
the organization supported attention to single-issue
health interventions or vertical approaches like interven-
tions into HIV/AIDS or malaria, in comparison to its at-
tention to overall health systems strengthening or
horizontal approaches to health development? How has
this impacted countries’ overall health system strength-
ening activities? To what extent has the IFC’s focus on
the private sector constrained – or facilitated – the
WBG’s ability to invest in primary health care?
To study these questions and situate the Bank within a
complex web of global health partners, we recommend
three methodological approaches. A first approach is to
perform network analysis to map the connections
formed by the WBG and ministries of finance and health
(or other high-ranking cabinet members). This would be
best accomplished by performing interview-intensive or
ethnographic case studies on the country level in coun-
tries that receive Bank funding. A second country-level
approach focuses on the congruence between the Bank’s
formal country investment plans and the health prior-
ities voiced by client countries. For instance, researchers
could identify health priorities stated in Bank country-
specific five-year action plans; analyze strategic health
policy documents from the national government during
this time period, which are produced with Bank and
WHO staff as well as other stakeholders; and perform
interviews with national stakeholders and staff from the
Bank and other major global health actors to understand
the programs that were ultimately implemented during
this time period. Such a document and interview-based
methodology would allow for a more accurate under-
standing of how (and whether) the Bank met country
and national priorities, and what health areas were
neglected.
The third approach is to investigate the Bank’s role in
vertical health interventions, by studying how silos form
in global health. This approach could use case studies,
based on archival research and interviews at Bank head-
quarters, of institutions that were part of the vertical
intervention, and a few countries that were beneficiaries
of the intervention. It would use these case studies to
analyze how funding decisions are made for particular
health areas (including the evidence used, most influen-
tial voices, and decision-making structure). For example,
researchers could investigate how the silo for investing
in HIV/AIDS interventions developed and why no such
silo has developed for intervening on mental health. Fo-
cusing on the Bank’s relative role in this prioritization
process would allow for a more nuanced understanding
of how the Bank has promoted (or not promoted) what
it itself calls “health system strengthening.” It could also
provide insight into the Bank’s influence on silo forma-
tion relative to other major global health agencies or
financiers.
Finance-based: shaping health financing mechanisms
Our final proposed research domain puts health finan-
cing at its center. The two of Moon’s [44] forms of glo-
bal governance power that are most important here are
economic, or the “use of material resources” to shape ac-
tion and thought, and institutional, which is described in
the section above. While the Bank’s ideological approach
to its health financing agenda has changed since it
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sanctioned direct lending in 1979, it has consistently
retained economic power through the sheer quantity of
its lending. During the late 1970s and in its 1980 World
Development Report, the Bank ideologically aligned with
the basic needs approach, and largely supported the pri-
mary health care movement championed by the Alma
Ata Declaration [67]. From the early 1980s through the
1990s, however, concerns about the affordability of uni-
versal primary health care drove the WBG and UNICEF
towards selective primary health care [12], and the Bank
embraced market-based resource allocation through its
Structural Adjustment Programs in an attempt secure it
[6, 52, 67]. As part of the Structural Adjustment Pro-
gram model, the Bank embraced user fees at the point of
service. The user fee debate has been covered well
through case studies, which may be best summarized as
pointing to their “sustainable inequity” [48], or enabling
of some service provision at the deep expense of equit-
able access (e.g., [21]). Robert and Ridde’s (2013) docu-
mentary analysis indicates that the majority of global
health actors surveyed from 2005 to 2011 favored either
the abolition of user fees or free care at the point of de-
livery, with the Bank as the only actor that still favored
both user fees and free care at the point of service.
As it prepared its health financing agenda for the new
millennium, the WBG’s Operations Evaluation Depart-
ment (the predecessor to the IEG) argued that, “despite
an initial focus on government health services, the Bank
is increasingly focusing on issues of private and nongov-
ernmental organization (NGO) service delivery, insur-
ance, and regulation,” and stated that clients viewed it as
a powerful actor for donor coordination [31]. Indeed,
since 2000, IBRD and IDA have shifted their language
toward increasing public expenditure in health and at-
tention to health systems strengthening [68], although
the relative growth of the Bank’s trust fund financing for
public-private partnerships compared to its core health
sector lending indicates that this shift may be somewhat
rhetorical [64]. The Bank’s embrace of health system
strengthening and UHC have been complicated by the
relative rise in power of the IFC and the WBG’s recent
renewed interest in insurance as a means to secure uni-
versal health coveragee. The relative percentage of health
and education within the IFC’s portfolio, for instance,
rose from 2 % in 2007 to 8 % in 2015, and it has cham-
pioned private health sector commitments for diagnostic
chains, health insurers, information technology, and
medical education [28]. In 2014, the HNP Global Prac-
tice was launched to accelerate progress towards UHC,
and to build on the WBG’s 2013 Corporate Strategy of
“One World Bank Group,” embracing public and private
solutions. However, as pointed -out by the Independent
Evaluation Group [29], collaboration between the IBRD/
IDA and the IFC may be more rhetoric than reality, with
a single Global Lead for Harnessing the Private Sector
leading coordination activities. The contrast between the
WBG’s stated support of UHC and the rise of IFC’s pri-
vatized investments in health has attracted surprisingly
little scholarly attention.
How have researchers unpacked the financing mecha-
nisms that fuel these financing ideologies? The World
Bank’s unique position in the terrain of financial govern-
ance because of the size of its health lending portfolio
cannot be overstated. Core World Bank funding for the
health sector (HNP programs) totaled approximately
$17.5 billion from 1985 to 2000, and $60.9 billion from
2000 to 2015 [78]. As Sridhar et al. [64] have docu-
mented, the theme allocation for HNP funding has
changed significantly over time, with the largest portion
(44%) targeted to reproductive, maternal, and child
health from 1985 to 2000, and the largest portion (34%)
going to budgetary support by 2000–2015. Yet, the
Bank’s reported HNP data is only the “tip of the ice-
berg,” in terms of its involvement in financing mecha-
nisms for projects that impact health.
At least three additional factors contribute to the
WBG’s influence on health financing. First, regional and
global trust funds for health activities have proliferated
as financing mechanisms since the 1990s, and are largely
not captured by HNP financing data. A few studies have
analyzed the reasons for the proliferation of trust funds
in the 1980s and 1990s, especially related to geopolitical
forces at the United Nations in the 1980s and 1990s
(e.g., [17, 72]). However, comprehensive thematic ana-
lyses of trust funds held at the Bank, particularly finan-
cial intermediary funds (modalities used to support
Global Partnership Programs) and IFC trust funds, have
not been undertaken. The IEG’s [29] report quantified
health sector support to IFC and IBRD/IDA trust funds
– which by 2016 supported approximately 29% of all
health services projects – but did not perform a deep
analysis of financial intermediary funds. These funds are
typically used to support national or global public goods,
often in collaboration with specialized United Nations
agencies (particularly the WHO and UNICEF). The Bank
is not a passive "banker" for most of these Global Part-
nership Programs [64]. For instance, as of 2016, the
World Bank Group was represented at the governing
body of twenty-two of the twenty-five existing Global
Partnership Programs. This has provided the Bank with
a distinct, influential network of high-level national and
international stakeholders [29].
Second, the Bank also exerts economic power on the
global health agenda through projects that are not tech-
nically in the health sector. As examples, many HNP
projects and trust funds are targeted at humanitarian
and sanitation projects in post-conflict states, and some
long-standing trust funds, such as the Consultative
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Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
and the Cities Alliance fund, support activities related to
food security and slum upgrading [30]. Third, health
projects can serve as a vehicle for building relationships
with the Bank and "leapfrogging" into wider lending ar-
rangements (e.g., [34]).
To further unpack the Bank’s economic power and fi-
nancial influence, we identify three main research ques-
tions: (1) in what ways has the WBG influenced the way
that the “public” and the “private” are conceived in glo-
bal health, (2) to what extent and through what vehicles
has it embraced a “selective” approach to primary health
care, and (3) what types of influence has it exerted
through its trust fund infrastructure, such as through
performance-based financing and its financing of Global
Partnership Programs?
The first question can be approached by “following the
money.” How much money is allocated to states and the
private sector in a country portfolio in a given number
of years, based on official project and disbursal reports?
The Global Health Governance Programme has analyzed
Bank financing, including trust funds, by the IBRD and
the IDA for health themes (e.g., [53, 68]; Winters et al.
2017 [64]), but scholars have not compared IFC, IBRD,
and IDA country loans and grants in a health-specific
context. This comparison of private health investments
across the WBG should be investigated with special
focus on any associated redistribution of social benefits,
especially at the national level. Tracking country invest-
ments may require archival or document-based research
and interviews in member states, as the Bank’s main mo-
dality is a government loan or grant, which may lack full
transparency in disbursal reports. It can also be
approached by studying the ideological underpinnings of
privatization across the Bank. For instance, researchers
could track the way that states and the market have been
discussed by Bank employees, and how this has changed
over time, through oral histories and document analysis.
Has the market-orientation of the Bank’s involvement in
health in the 1980s and through its 1993 World Develop-
ment Report been replaced with other conceptualizations
of health equity, and how do these new visions position
health within the Bank’s larger development agenda? Fi-
nally, research on privatization should focus on the pres-
ence or absence of policy coherence between different
Bank entities, especially between the IBRD, the IDA, and
the IFC.
The second question builds on Structural Adjustment
Programs and the Bank’s lack of buy-in to the primary
health care movement. This area requires a deeper investi-
gation of the links between UNICEF and the World Bank,
which have often been closer than the Bank and the
WHO (e.g., [76]). In this context, "following the money"
may be complicated, due to low transparency of early trust
funds at the Bank [79]. A document-based analysis of the
Special Grants Program and Development Grant Facility,
including financial records and memoranda from the
WBG Archives, may be most effective. This research
could be supplemented with oral histories and interview-
based methods, with both World Bank staff and national
staff involved in collaborative global programs.
For the third question, it would be productive to per-
form deeper analyses of the Bank’s performance- and
results-based financing programs and Global Partner-
ship Programs. Results-based financing has been used
by the Bank over the last twenty years incentivize per-
formance and improve efficiency of service delivery in
LMICs [51]. The Health Results Innovation Trust Fund
(HRITF), launched in 2007 and closed for fundraising
in 2017, was designed to build and share an evidence
base from results-based financing in the health sector,
and represents the Bank’s newer model of coupling
country grants with IDA lending. It has been replaced
by the heavily-funded Global Financing Facility in Sup-
port of Every Woman Every Child (GFF), which incor-
porates a similar model of "catalytic aid" [27, 29]. To
critically approach the HRITF and GFF and understand
the diffusion of performance-based financing at the glo-
bal level, it may be helpful to begin with critical dis-
course and documentary analyses. Taking Gautier and
Ridde's [20] and Robert and Ridde's [55] analyses of
user fee favorability and HRITF politicized evidence, re-
spectively, as examples, sources for this research could
include public documents from official websites (both
the Bank and participating governments). For projects
with Implementation Completion and Results (ICR)
available, researchers could use Malik and Stone’s [40]
coding system to further understand private actors’ po-
tential influence over project evaluation and enforce-
ment of conditionality.
Analyzing the complex influence that the World Bank
exerts relative to other global health actors through
performance-based financing and Global Partnership
Programs may require deeper access to its experts. This
can be provided through ethnographic approaches and
oral histories, such as those conducted by Lie [39] on
the World Bank-Uganda partnership. Ethnographies
may be most appropriate to disentangle the Bank’s col-
laborations with the IFC (including at a country level),
its financial relationships with ‘clients’ within country
portfolios, and its influence – and role as a broker – on
financial intermediary fund boards.
Conclusions
We have argued that studying the WBG’s influence
on global health requires an acknowledgement that
the institution is not a monolith and that the bound-
aries of “health” may be blurred; that different WBG
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entities’ approaches to financial and technical assist-
ance have changed in the four decades since the
WBG first engaged in health development in earnest;
and that the WBG often works in concert with other
global health partners. It also requires an understand-
ing that major global health actors’ self-reporting of
their programmatic impacts may differ substantially
from the downstream effects of these programs on
local health systems or communities, a phenomenon
that Rajoktia [54] has called the “success cartel.” For
instance, the Bank has crafted success narratives by
selectively using cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness
analyses (Walker 2019 [7]; Birn 2011 [78];).
It is challenging to study a single player in the com-
plex landscape of global health governance. This is par-
ticularly the case for the WBG, because it prefers to
operate behind the scenes, has multiple arms, forms
partnerships with many other players, and has projects
that extend beyond the health sector. Research on the
WBG is therefore vulnerable to “riding the tiger” or
promoting its self-produced image, such as its strengths
as a “Knowledge Bank,” as a producer of catalytic aid,
and as a promoter of health system strengthening, as
well as its asserted reversal from the neoliberal under-
pinnings of its structural adjustment policies. At the
same time, the WBG is both an interesting and import-
ant object of social scientific study. The magnitude of
its health lending to countries in the Global South –
coupled with its unique in-country contact points, trad-
ition of close concertation with the IMF and private
capital, and deep interest in providing market-based in-
centives for health – give it a strategic and privileged
position in global health priority setting, implementa-
tion, and impact analysis.
We have developed a research agenda to guide a
more nuanced understanding of the WBG’s influence
on global health since the 1970s, and the ways that
its policies and investments are shaped by larger
power dynamics between different bilateral and multi-
lateral agencies and UN member states. This research
agenda contains three dimensions: knowledge-based,
governance-based, and finance-based, which are best
viewed as overlapping lenses for analysis. We argue
that multiple social scientific disciplines and method-
ologies together can contribute to discerning the
complexities of the WBG’s influence. At the end of
the day, helping countries to establish the basis for
development is the main reason for which the Bank
was created and is a mechanism through which it has
gained legitimacy in the health sector. Our proposed
research agenda will provide a step towards both
holding the WBG to account for its constructs and
actions, and helping it operate in ways that address
the needs of the countries to which it lends.
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